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ABSTRACT: Foucault’s debt to Kant is usually examined with respect to his ethos of critique.  
In fact, Kant’s writings on aesthetic judgment, teleological judgment, and anthropology consti-
tute an important, if implicit, object of Foucault’s genealogical efforts to free Western culture 
from a scientia sexualis that oppresses sexual minorities.  Comparing Foucault’s use of Kant to 
the use made by psychoanalytic theorists of sexual difference, this paper argues that the con-
cept of non-teleological pleasure found in Kant’s critique of aesthetic judgment may provide 
grounds for queer thinkers to resist and reconfigure associations between death, knowledge, 
and sexuality as a function of organisms—associations inherited from the post-Kantian phi-
losophical anthropology and biological medicine of the nineteenth century.   
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According to Foucault, “The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of 
sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures.”1  Under the pseudonym Mau-
rice Florence, he also claimed to be most at home in philosophy among the inheritors of Kant.2  
Now, one would certainly not expect to find bodies and pleasures in Kant’s philosophy.  Kant 
is as disdainful of sensuality as of sexuality;3 he regards most pleasure as mere difference of 
degree in sensation;4 and has horrifying things to say about homosexuality, a crime worse than 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: 
Random House, 1978), 157. 
2 Michel Foucault, “Foucault,” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 
Vol. 2, edited by James Faubion (New York: New Press, 1998), 459. 
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, edited by Paul S. Guyer, translated by Paul S. Guyer and 
Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:274; Critique of Practical Reason, translated 
and edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5:30. Where English transla-
tions include page numbers to the Akademie Ausgabe edition, citations are to the volume and page of the 
Akademie edition.   
4 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:23 and Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:266.  In the Critique of 
Practical Reason, Kant argues that differences among an individual’s pleasures are only differences of degree, 
and cannot be used to distinguish between mental and bodily representations.  In Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, likewise, “The agreeable, as an incentive for the desires, is of the same kind throughout no matter 
where it comes from and how specifically different the representation (of sense and of sensation, objectively 
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suicide, though not perhaps regicide.5  Foucault and Perniola  both remark the tacit violence 
and affectlessness with which Kant regards the legal exchange of bodies in marriage.6  Most 
recently, Alan Soble has drawn attention to Kant’s passionate, but philosophically dubious 
arguments that all forms of non-marital, non-heterosexual eroticism are both contrary to na-
ture and violate the duty to treat oneself as an end.7 
Indeed, it remains a matter for argument where human bodies fit in Kant’s portrait of 
experience, except as empirical objects.8  But what if we assume that something in Kant’s Cri-
tique of the Power of Judgment is very useful to Foucault’s project?  After all, the third Critique 
was thought and written at a historical moment prior to the “deployment of sexuality.”  The 
notion of aesthetic pleasure might provide a niche in the Kantian system and in the history of 
Western philosophy for all those attractions, bodies, and pleasures which were rejected as 
“abnormal” by nineteenth century philosophical anthropology and biological medicine— dis-
ciplines to whose groundwork Kant himself contributed, and to which the deployment of 
sexuality appealed for intellectual justification.9   In fact, aesthetic pleasure would play this 
role precisely because it results from collective phenomena escaping the determinate cognitive 
or moral judgments of individual subjects. 
Nowhere has Michel Foucault’s impact been greater than in the historical and political 
study of sexual culture.  However, the role played by Kant in Foucault’s development has not 
                                                                                                                                                                  
considered) may be.”  However, he does believe that the kinds of pleasure produced by enjoyment, moral 
behavior, and apprehension of beauty are different and reflect the activity of different faculties. (Ibid, 5:291-
292) 
5 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, translated and edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 6:425, 320-321. 
6 Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, edited by Roberto Nigro, translated by Roberto Nigro 
and Kate Briggs (New York: Semiotext(e), 2008), 39-44; Mario Perniola, The Sex Appeal of the Inorganic: Phi-
losophies of Desire in the Modern World, translated by Massimo Verdicchio (London: Continuum, 2004), 18-20. 
7 Alan Soble, ”Kant and Sexual Perversion,” The Monist vol. 86, no. 1 (2003), 55-89.  Soble also discusses the 
misogyny entailed when the duty to treat one’s own person as an end is combined with a firm belief in 
women’s civil and sexual passivity, especially where sexual coercion is concerned.  Soble carefully unpacks 
the ways in which Kant “secularizes” Thomistic views on sexual morality.   
8 Susan Meld Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation and Community (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1996); Angelica Nuzzo, Ideal Embodiment: Kant’s Theory of Sensibility (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008); see also Andrew Carpenter, Kant’s Earliest Solution to the Mind-Body Problem and True 
Estimation of Living Forces (translation of Kant) (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1998).  As Kant’s anthropological and his-
torical writings have received more attention in the Anglophone world, the place of the body in his theories 
of knowledge and ethics has come under scrutiny.  Shell argues that the difficulty of determining bodily 
boundaries and explaining real interaction between substances drives Kant’s critical project and the relation-
ship of metaphysics and politics therein.  Nuzzo has challenged the notion that Kant gives no rights to sensi-
bility, arguing that the critical project is essentially a redefinition of the human body as neither fully tran-
scendental nor empirical, mental nor physical.   
9 Urban Wiesing, “Immanuel Kant, his philosophy and medicine,” Medical Health Care and Philosophy vol. 11 
(2008), 221-236; Alix Cohen, Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology, and History (Hampshire, UK: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).  Wiesing offers a study of Kant’s influence on western medicine, especially as a 
critical epistemologist; Cohen argues in detail that Kant considered biology the model for human sciences 
such as anthropology and history. 
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been viewed as contributing to this study, and has been examined largely in the context of his 
critical ethos.  Mapping the invisible territory in Foucault’s relationship to Kant may be help-
ful to theorists working at the intersection of philosophy, queer studies, and history of ideas, 
for Kant’s writings not only mark a reorganization of Western epistemology but a new effort 
to divide the disciplines from one another on the basis of pleasures that are neither moral nor 
biological/animal.  Since Kant’s transcendental philosophy is still invoked by psychoanalytic 
theorists writing on sexual difference and the vicissitudes of desire, just as his defense of 
moral autonomy appeals to contemporary liberal advocates of queer civil rights, it seems es-
sential to return those ideas to the scene of reflection within which modern tolerance and 
modern intolerance were both cultivated. 
Approaching Kant as having tacitly left a “non-moral” place for unorthodox attractions 
and pleasures in the Critique of the Power of Judgment—at a moment before biological and 
medical bodies became scientifically “normative”—we can more easily make sense of Fou-
cault’s claim to have been working through a Kantian problematic his entire career.  We are 
also better equipped to situate the interrogation of sexuality undertaken by Foucault and later 
queer theorists with respect to the history of Western philosophy.  Yes, Kant goes out of his 
way to purge aesthetic experience of enjoyment or “gratification” understood in a biologically 
teleological sense, but this does not mean that it might not contain a potentially shared world 
of forms giving rise to non-biological and non-teleological troubles and pleasures.10  Studying 
Foucault with aesthetic judgment in mind recontextualizes claims about the intrinsically 
transgressive, dangerous, or anodyne nature of queer sexual practices in popular culture and 
in the work of recent feminist, lesbian and gay writers. 
 
The Critique of the Power of Judgment 
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment has two sections: the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” 
and the “Critique of Teleological Judgment.”  The first section is roughly concerned with the 
way we must conceive of the power of judgment if we are to make sense of the fact that people 
demand universal agreement for their claims that natural phenomena or artistic works are 
“beautiful” or “sublime”—even though these claims cannot be based on objective criteria and 
are often contested by other critics.  Since Kant identifies the kind of pleasure that accompa-
nies an act of aesthetic judgment as “disinterested,” this might seem an odd place to locate 
marginalized instances of erotic attraction.  However, by “disinterested” Kant means that the 
form or phenomena being judged (say, the grace of a flower) is not the motivation for either a 
pragmatic (instrumental) or moral act.11  This is because, though the form may be associated 
                                                 
10 For example, Perniola, 38-39; Nuzzo, 206.  Perniola argues that a non-orgasmic sexuality would fall into 
the category of a feeling [Gefühl] experienced, like “respect,” only by things “in themselves.”  This is merely 
to establish an analogy between two forms of feeling that do not quite fit the category of gratification, not to 
identify them.  For Nuzzo, the space for pure aesthetic judgment had to be created; it did not already exist to 
be purged of pleasure.  Nuzzo contends that the Critique of Pure Reason excluded sensibility from having a 
determining role in cognition, but that this exclusion left room for Kant to identify forms of sensibility (re-
spect and pure aesthetic pleasure) that would have non-determining roles in moral action and reflective 
judgment, where they are symptoms rather than causes of practical reason and judgment. 
11 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:204-211. 
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with a recognizable object (i.e. a flower), the form has not been brought under a concept that 
would enable it to function as the object of such an act.12  
In short, aesthetic judgment is provoked by a mere form, or in some cases formlessness, 
that is not yet or never could be a determinate “object.”13  The diverse forms of flowers would 
exemplify pure form; the aesthetic impression of approaching storm clouds or a swelling or-
chestral sound might illustrate sublime formlessness.  This form (or formlessness) corresponds 
to a certain state or relationship among faculties of the mind that Kant calls “reflective” and de-
scribes phenomenologically as “lingering” [beiweilen].14  Beautiful form is “subjectively pur-
posive” even though it cannot be put to any “objective purpose” or inserted in a causal chain 
apart from the reflecting agent; sublime formlessness is experienced as counter-purposive, but 
in a way that provokes a renewed feeling of inner human purpose.15  Examining such forms or 
threats to form allows us to divine the structure of judgment, a “territory” (Boden) without a 
“domain” (Gebiet).16 
There are two features of an aesthetic judgment worth noting.  The first is that while 
the form being contemplated is not approached as the form of an “object” (even if it might be the 
form of an object, as with an artwork or a flower), the observer’s state of mind is one he or she 
judges to be universally communicable.17  In other words, regardless of empirical evidence 
that others agree or disagree, the observer has the right to expect that other observers assess-
ing this form or phenomenon would achieve a similar state of mind.  The second is that al-
though it judges without a concept (of a specific kind of object) we could not generate concepts 
allowing us to identify and communicate our perception of unfamiliar objects to others with-
out something like reflective judgment.18  In other words, the kind of reflective relationship 
between faculties that gives rise to a judgment of beauty or sublimity is the same kind of re-
flective relationship we discover in every attempt to find the “right concepts” for attracting 
others’ attention to something surprising in our shared experience, whether as artists, scien-
tists, or laypeople.    
In the second part of the volume, the “Critique of Teleological Judgment,” Kant asks 
how scientists can find order in the unfamiliar forms of the natural world.  His explanation is 
that we apprehend these forms through reflective judgment.  In fact, we treat nature as com-
posed of artworks even though we have no philosophical reason to believe that an artist has 
created them.19  By doing so, we can imagine that observable parts and processes are functions 
of a larger whole, whether individual organisms or nature as a totality.  Biologists and geolo-
gists, in other words, apprehend natural forms whose purposes they do not know in the same 
potentially communicable state of mind that they appreciate works of art.  But unlike art critics, 
scientists do attribute concepts and functions to the objects they encounter.   
                                                 
12 Ibid., 5:226-228. 
13 Ibid., 5:220, 245. 
14 Ibid., 5:222. 
15 Ibid., 5:189, 192. 
16 Ibid., 5:177. 
17 Ibid., 5:191, 217-19, 238-239. 
18 Ibid., 20:243-244; 5:217-219, 265-266. 
19 Ibid., 5:382-383 
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The pleasure in an aesthetic judgment is, therefore, “disinterested” in the sense that it is 
non-teleological—the faculties enter into a free play, with no necessary outcome.20  Such 
judgments neither relate means and ends in an objectively necessary manner nor actualize the 
subject’s moral freedom.   Judgments reflecting the biological needs of human beings, among 
which Kant would include sex, are definitely “interested.”  In fact, at this point in Enlighten-
ment Europe, sexual appetite was thought to be an irrepressible natural force.21  In his first 
Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, moreover, Kant specified that teleological 
scientific judgment per se involve no pleasure.22  But many of the qualities giving a fantasy or 
encounter an erotic tone are not related to a biologically identifiable function; they are usually 
quite hard to define.  Most importantly, if we accept Kant’s account of how humans appre-
hend nature, we must assume that biological functions, human or otherwise, could only have 
been identified as such in a reflective state—one capable of turning into a peculiar “disinter-
ested” pleasure, even if it did not have this effect upon the researcher.   
Of course many functions of human biology and physiology were known well before 
Kant’s time.  Such knowledge was based on combinations of an older Galenic/Aristotelian 
medicine and recent discoveries by empiricists (e.g. Laqueur 1987).23  Doctors and laypeople 
also appealed to folk wisdom, pornography, and treatises like the apocryphal Aristotle’s Mas-
terpiece to address sexual difficulties that, as Foucault explains in Abnormal, were only begin-
ning to be regarded as matters of potential state concern.24  But Kant suggests that these forms 
of knowledge, insofar as they went beyond mere tradition or superstition, were discovered 
using reflective judgment; they could not, for example, be deduced from first principles of 
physics.   
So even if Kant has an implicit, everyday sense for which human perceptions are likely 
to be “interested” and which might be purely aesthetic, his goal is to understand how such an 
assessment might have been made and how it could have been justified.  We must remember 
that Kant is writing prior to the establishment of a historical standard for scientific perception 
of the human organism and the functions, needs and motivations, a standard he wishes to 
help establish.  A general notion of concupiscence common to both sexes was governed by 
various religious and legal restrictions on the use of bodies in or outside of marriage: this was 
“nature.”  Kant himself attempted to add to the store of medical knowledge, and to sort true 
from imaginative views about healthy functioning, through his numerous reflections on hypo-
                                                 
20 Ibid., 5: 217-218. 
21 Isabel Hull, Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700-1815 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 
236-245.  
22 Kant, Critique of Power of Judgment, 20:228. 
23 E.g., Thomas Laqueur, “Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of Reproductive Biology,” in Catherine Gal-
lagher and Thomas Laqueur (eds.), The Making of the Modern Body: Sexuality and Society in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 1-41. 
24 Peter Wagner, “The discourse on sex – or sex as discourse: Eighteenth-century medical and paramedical 
erotica,” in G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (eds.), Sexual Underworlds of the Enlightenment (Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press), 46-68; Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975, 
edited by Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 
2003).   
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chondria.25  By the nineteenth century, “normal” and “abnormal” sexual behavior will be de-
fined in terms of functions rather than in terms of more and less universal perceptions regarding 
viscerally troubling forms and instances of apparent formlessness, although they will still re-
tain a link with moral dignity and righteousness or outrage. 
In History of Madness, Foucault argues that the distinction within western thought be-
tween madness and reason—whether philosophical, scientific, or moral reason—was first 
drawn by Descartes, or at least by the royal administrators who interned vagabonds shortly 
before Descartes.26  In Birth of the Clinic, on the other hand, Foucault contends that only a cer-
tain conception of death made it possible for 18th century doctors to understand disease as a vital 
process intersecting and interfering with the functions of the living human body.27  Both mad-
ness and disease, we surmise, could only be recognized through reflective judgment.  Insofar 
as medicine understood sexuality as either a “natural function” or as a “sign of disease,” it 
employed the teleological version of reflective judgment: sexuality thus became the exercise of 
a function aiming at the goal of either orgasm or reproduction.  Obviously, aesthetic pleasure 
results in neither orgasm nor reproduction.  But perhaps it is through aesthetic pleasure that 
we learn how to recognize a form—or a certain kind of formlessness—worthy of being coupled 
with, and how to make our own form appealing to others, just as it is through teleological 
judgment that we learn how to regard ourselves and our partners as organisms defined by 
their functions.   
Kant does not believe that the beauty or sublimity of an aesthetic judgment is ascer-
tained by finding out if others actually agree that a given form provokes the right state of mind 
for generating concepts.28  Rather he claims that when we experience that state of mind, we 
have a right to demand that others will agree with us.  Thus Kant considers education of taste, 
the training of artists, and the enjoyment of natural and crafted beauty crucial in actually form-
ing human beings who can relate to each other both as autonomous moral individuals and as 
cognitively homologous observers of a common perceptual and scientific world.29  However, 
the problem remains that the form of our own existence is open to indeterminacy and its dif-
ference from others is subject to reevaluation.30  Kant emphasizes the function of art in creating 
                                                 
25  Kant’s contributions in this domain were primarily of the “practical” clinical sort, and usually concerned 
the interaction between mental and physical representations of well-being.  See, for example, “On the Power 
of the Mind to Master its Morbid Feelings By Sheer Resolution,” a response to Hufeland’s On the Art of Pro-
longing Human Life in part 3 of Conflict of the Faculties, translated by Mary J. Gregor (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1992), and Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View; edited and translated by Robert B. 
Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 7: 212-213.   
26 Michel Foucault, History of Madness, edited by Jean Khalfa, translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 44-55. 
27 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, translated by A.M. Sheridan 
Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 143-144; 153-156. 
28 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:212-213, 239. 
29 Ibid., 5:296-298. 
30 Randall Halle, Queer Social Philosophy: Critical Readings from Kant to Adorno (Urbana and Chicago: Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, 2004), 36. Halle paraphrases Georg Simmel: “the Kantian ego is not an individuality; 
rather, it has individuality… This distinction—between truly being an individual and having individuality—
shows that the Kantian subject postulated in the critical works relies on a homogeneity of individuality that will 
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commonality, but often it is through disagreements over art that people learn that they have 
less in common; that they are actually more separate and conform less to a common “concept” 
of determinate judgment regarding humanity than they might have initially believed. 
The biological understanding of homo sapiens may not be the truest or most comprehen-
sive account of human being-in-the-world, but it is the one in which humans have learned to 
most easily see themselves.  Understanding sexuality as a biological, teleological function re-
sulting in orgasm or reproduction is part of the West’s historically developed biomedical under-
standing of what makes us similar to one another and what separates us. 
 
Biology and the Human Sciences Through Kant’s Looking-Glass  
Kant contributed to this process in two ways.  First, he posited that all human knowledge was 
made possible by the finite nature of human beings, rather than, as his rationalist predecessors 
assumed, human approximations to an infinite, divine understanding.31  Human limitations 
were not simply cognitive obstacles, but also positive conditions for experience and knowl-
edge.  Although Kant’s impact on the physical sciences is better known than his contribution 
to debates over biology and the human sciences, vast scientific and administrative advances 
over the following century were based upon and justified by some version of this radical epis-
temological shift.32  In his early writings, Foucault documented how “human” sciences like 
psychiatry, medicine, and criminology emerged from the localization and observation of phe-
nomena previously considered resistant to scientific understanding because they were signal 
examples of human finitude: madness, death, and criminality.33  
However, the transcendental framework of Kant’s finite understanding lent itself to 
enormously varied and undetermined psychological and cultural manifestations.  For exam-
ple, although space and time are conditions of experience, Kant says very little about the posi-
tive contribution to experience and knowledge made by the human body, rather than the 
power of sensibility.34  To some philosophers, this is precisely its appeal; others, like Hegel, 
find it unacceptably abstract.  But Kant supplemented his theoretical writings with historical 
and “anthropological” reflections treating the empirical manifestations of human psychology, 
culture, and politics.  In these writings, Kant wrestled with the relationship between the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
conflict with the heterogeneity of individuals examined in his social-philosophical and anthropological 
works.”  In fact, homogeneity in our ways of perceiving natural unity and diversity can never be taken for 
granted anthropologically but must be inculcated through conversation, art, and culture.  
31 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Co., 1996), B xvi-xviii. 
32 These go beyond the specific applications of Kantian epistemology to medicine described in Wiesing.   
33 Foucault, History of Madness; Foucault, Birth of the Clinic; Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977). A more detailed version of this argu-
ment can be found in Laura Hengehold, The Body Problematic: Political Imagination in Kant and Foucault (Uni-
versity Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2007). 
34 The body, particularly the extremities like hands which have right and left orientation and the skin as a 
boundary between “inner” and “outer” experience, played an important role in Kant’s search for a common 
structure for the determination of substances in his early theoretical writings.  This structure was eventually 
identified with space and time as transcendental idealities. 
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purely conceptual and the empirically medical aspects of embodied experience.35  Finitude is a 
feature of thought as well as empirical psychology and physiology, but Kant was never en-
tirely sure which aspects of human existence could be altered by reflection—or how deeply 
the body as known by medical science was molded by the requirements of cognition and 
communication.   
In Mad For Foucault, Lynne Huffer argues that the forms of unreason excluded by Des-
cartes from modern philosophical and scientific thought included not only what we would call 
psychiatric “madness,” but also the passion and eroticism previously associated with spiritu-
ality or with heresy.36  According to Huffer, Foucault’s claim in History of Sexuality that the 
West has substituted a scientia sexualis for the ars erotica found in other societies, takes on a 
new meaning if it is read as continuous with his early work on the history of madness.37  
However, the fact that Foucault accompanied History of Madness with a thèse secondaire on the 
status of anthropology in Kant’s system, and his further reflections on Kant and anthropology 
in The Order of Things, suggest that he believed Kantian epistemology ultimately had more 
influence on the development of nineteenth century sciences than did Cartesianism.38  It is in 
the nineteenth century, the post-Kantian century, that sexuality was framed as a strictly bio-
logical, teleological phenomenon admitting a “norm” like other physiological functions.   
Kant’s “Critique of Teleological Judgment” went beyond Cartesian mechanism, which 
tried to reduce even living beings to the laws governing inert matter.  Kant attempted to ex-
plain and justify our efforts to understand natural beings as organisms, that is, holistic entities 
with internal functions and goals.  But biological science, which identifies natural “interests” 
of the human organism, is not the only application of reflective judgment as described in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, and biological phenomena are only a subset of the experiences 
of form and formlessness giving rise to either “interested” or “disinterested” pleasure.  Recog-
nizing that the “body” of modern medicine is an object of teleological judgment forces us to 
wonder if any “body” was involved in aesthetic apprehension?  Has the body handed down in 
western culture been defined in opposition to such “lingering” fascination and admiration?   
Kant appears to subscribe to the tacitly naturalistic understanding of sexuality, which 
reached its mature form in nineteenth century biology.  For example, he states that “Nature’s 
end in the cohabitation of the sexes is procreation; that is, the preservation of the species.”39  
On the other hand, in the Anthropology Kant admits that the natural purpose behind nature’s 
division of the human species into two sexes is ultimately unfathomable, and reason threatens 
                                                 
35 This relationship is extensively dealt with in Shell and Nuzzo.  For example, in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, Anthropology, and Conflict of the Faculties, Kant reflects on the way that a free play of sensations in 
apprehending beauty, natural order, or even lively conversation may promote the feeling of health. 
36 Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 73, 79, 229. 
37 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 57-58, 67-68; Huffer, 24-25.  
38 Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology; Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1970). 
39 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:426.  
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to lose itself in “darkness” in too closely enquiring.40  The scientifically understood body and 
its desires separate sexuality as a function from the emotions and pleasures that would have 
comprised eros or the flesh.41  Perhaps we must look to pure aesthetic pleasure for all the sensa-
tions and emotions, the puzzled fascinations and attractions that cannot be identified with the 
desire of an organism or the desire for an organism.   
The sexually dimorphic body and its “sex-desires” are a selection from the range of 
forms and pleasures that are available to critics/viewers.  If the sexual being is one who appre-
ciates his or her companion as a source of aesthetic pleasure rather than “mere” sensibility, 
this enables him or her to resonate with the emotions and pleasures of others.  Periodically 
(most obviously in the case of transsexuals), these encounters drive sexual beings to reconsider 
their own empirical bodily form.42   
 
Aesthetics and Teleology in Contemporary Theory 
In recent years, Lacanian theorists such as Joan Copjec, Renata Salecl, and Monique David-
Ménard have tried to explain the apparent psychological and experiential differences between 
the two sexes in terms of the difference between dynamical and mathematical antinomies af-
flicting philosophical efforts to determine the ground of objective experience in Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason.43  Kant blames our habit of treating appearances as if they were things in them-
selves for four antinomies, or irresolvable conflicts in our thoughts about metaphysics, includ-
ing the origin of the universe, its extent in time and space, the possibility of freedom, and the 
existence of an ultimate cause.   According to Lacan, one futile style of reasoning about reality 
as a whole (the dynamical antinomies) resembles the logic by which women are thought to 
conform to a norm “as women;” while the other futile way (the mathematical antinomies) re-
sembles the way men are thought to share an (impossible) “phallic function.” 
Of course, what matters to Lacan and his followers is the duality of metaphysical ap-
proaches, the connection between our reasoning about metaphysics and our reasoning about 
sex—and not the sexual identities themselves, much less any possible heterosexual attraction 
between the people holding these identities.  In fact, in Seminar XX Lacan argued that the pur-
                                                 
40 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View, 7:177n.  According to Perniola, Kant excludes 
fetishism, which Foucault considered the nineteenth-century model for all perversions, from either a moral 
or a utilitarian pragmatic rationality.  See Perniola, 55-56. 
41 Huffer, 78-80; Lynda Hart, Between the Body and the Flesh: Performing Sadomasochism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998). 
42 Perniola’s nonorganic pleasures are likewise a selection.  While Kant tried to overcome Cartesian dualism in 
an original way, Perniola wishes to explore the domain of pleasures that an alternate Cartesianism would 
have associated with the feeling (rather than thinking) thing.  Having no personal attachment to dualism, I see 
no need for a purism of either organic/teleological or nonorganic pleasures; though I think a pluralism is es-
sential.   
43 Joan Copjec, “Sex and the Euthanasia of Reason,” in Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1994); Monique David-Ménard, Les Constructions de l’Universel: Psychanalyse, Philosophie 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997); Renata Salecl, On Anxiety (New York: Routledge, 2004), 81-83.  
Slavoj Žižek proposes to reverse the sexes Copjec associates with dynamical and mathematical antinomies, 
respectively.  See Žižek, Tarrying With the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1993), 53-58.   
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suit of scientific knowledge was itself an attempt to demonstrate the existence of a “sexual 
relation,” in other words, the cosmic necessity or inevitability of two sexes fitting together.44  
Here it is not only a question of how desire—including the desire for stable social categories 
and goals—shapes our need to find certain kinds of patterns in the universe, but also how that 
understanding of the universe affects and justifies reflections on desire and bodily difference. 
Like Kant, Lacan believed that finitude strictly speaking had no necessary anthropo-
logical form.  Consequently, neither could the two sexes “complement” each other.  In fact, 
what Lacan’s followers have found is a kind of highly structured “failure to complement” be-
tween these two proto-sexual philosophical impasses.  The problem, of course, is that Kant’s 
readers (including Lacan) usually remain focused on finite anthropological answers to the 
fundamental questions of communicable form and affect, when the answers properly seem 
indefinite, if not infinite.  They try to explain the dualism of heterosexual identifications and 
desires, even as a failed project, rather than to understand the gamut of possible identifications 
and desires.  Rooting sexual difference in the antinomies suggests that as it provokes erotic 
attraction and pleasure, ultimately structuring each subject’s sense for reality as a whole, dif-
ference will in-evitably be “twofold.”  In other words, the Lacanians substitute empirical data 
about what (many) people do find aesthetically compelling for a transcendental understanding 
of what would make anything aesthetically compelling. 
One can say that binary sexual difference and attraction are obviously “real” because 
Kant was a kind of realist and we “know” there are two sexes.  But it may be that these an-
thropological answers to the problem of finitude (such as two sexes, oriented toward each  
other by potentially generative acts) are so many historical aesthetic forms that guarantee the 
communicability essential for aesthetic pleasure (as well as orgasm and, for those so inclined, 
reproduction).  How do people know how to interpret their desires, so that others will recog-
nize a common project and join in?  In the West, this communicability is safeguarded by the 
aesthetic forms of scientia, along with commentary, the author function, and the “fellowship of 
discourse.”45  But it is also safeguarded by popular erotic traditions including pornography 
and specialized clubs or subcultures, as well as religions predating the popularization of 
medical science.  All of these communal practices provide readily adaptable forms or tem-
plates for sexual identification and interaction.   
However, what provokes reflection in the act of aesthetic judgment is not the empiri-
cally recognizable aspect of a given phenomenon, but an aspect resisting immediate concep-
tual recognition, or else a specific experience of formlessness arousing simultaneous feelings of 
power and (limited) anxiety.46  These aspects need not be materially present and should not be 
reduced to visual contemplation, either in reality or in the mind’s eye.  If heterosexuality did 
not also “work” aesthetically for most of its adepts, it would not have generated such efforts at 
scientific explanation, nor probably such religious conviction that it was nature per se.  Again, 
                                                 
44 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX/ On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge: 
Encore 1972-1973, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), 
9, 11.  
45 Michel Foucault, “Appendix: The Discourse on Language” in The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse 
on Language, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 222-224. 
46 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 260-261.  
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the question is not what we believe about attraction and pleasure, but how the intensity of that 
belief is sufficiently justified for us to look for its cause in the functions of a body understood as 
an organism.   
Freud believed that for some (male) children, the female genitalia presented exactly this 
sort of inchoate form or threatening formlessness Kant seems to associate, on a larger natural 
scale, with the sublime.47  Fetishism, according to Freud, was the lasting symptom of a child’s 
refusal to believe that women’s bodies were incomplete or to let his faculties enter into a “free 
play” when apprehending them, “for if a woman had been castrated then [the boy’s] own pos-
session of a penis was in danger, and against that there arose in rebellion the portion of his 
narcissism which Nature has, as a rule, attached to that particular organ.”  
Since in fact there is no reason to regard women as anatomically incomplete, one is 
tempted to look for more explanations.  Could fetishists also have been children (male or fe-
male) who tried to create a concept for their experience of multiple sexual differences, espe-
cially differences of power and style, despite adults’ insistence on dimorphism?  Could they 
have been attempting to identify a determinate, repeatable object that could explain the mixed 
fascination and horror of their reflective judgment?  E. L. McCallum argues that fetishism is an 
epistemological strategy that resists an easy “determinate” recognition of sameness or simple 
“two-ness” in the diversity of human bodies.48  From this perspective, it seems that Freud was 
trying to identify a determinate basis for fetishism in a negative response to sexual difference as 
known by biology, a negative response which sets aside biological “interest,” rather than in a 
positive response to form or formlessness.49  He substituted the object of an interest or a func-
tion for the source of erotic and emotional trouble.50 
According to Foucault, fetishism—the generic term for a sexual preference that goes 
beyond the “primary” and “secondary” characteristics of sexual difference—was “the guiding 
thread for analyzing all the other deviations.”51  As such, the category belongs to the same bio-
logical discourse that it seemed to resist.  The problem with such preferences is that while 
Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment gives devotees a right to demand that others share their 
state of mind, very few empirically do.  We don’t know whether this is inevitably the case or 
                                                 
47 Sigmund Freud, “Fetishism,” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 
21, edited and translated by James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1950), 153.  
48 E. L. McCallum, Object Lessons: How to Do Things With Fetishism (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1999).   
49 On the child’s awareness of sexual ambiguity and resulting fascination, see McCallum; as well as Claire 
Nahon, “The Excess Visibility of an Invisible Sex or the Privileges of the Formless,” and Sabine Prokhoris, 
“The Prescribed Sex,” in Contemporary French Feminism, Kelly Oliver and Lisa Walsh (eds.) (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2004), 159-176; 177-200.  Judith Butler offers some suggestions for how to meaning-
fully break up the duality between sexes into forms and categories that can be manifest in either sex; see “The 
Lesbian Phallus and the Morphological Imaginary,” in Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” 
(New York: Routledge, 1993), 57-91.  On medical responses to intersex patients and the phenomenology of 
intersexed people’s social lives and involvement with the medical system, see Katrina Karkazis, Fixing Sex: 
Intersex, Medical Authority, and Lived Experience (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008). 
50 I use the word here in its French sense meaning disquiet or agitation without a clear object, especially sex-
ual or emotional agitation. 
51 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 154.  
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whether this is the result of the way in which our ability to communicate and respond to 
forms has been trained.  (Moralists are often alarmed that it seems possible to “learn” an ap-
preciation for certain fetishes).  Nor, according to Kant, could the fact that disinterested pleas-
ure expresses itself as a universal call for agreement mean that empirically, anthropologically, 
and historically, universal agreement on such preferences could be enforced through some kind 
of aesthetic education, in the way that Western societies have long tried to enforce universal 
agreement on sexual tastes through positive laws against homosexuality.52  
 
Finitude and the Sexual Order of Things  
In many of Kant’s writings, the power of imagination is ambiguously featured as necessary for 
human cognition and experience and as a threat to the structure of that experience.  “Dreams 
of a Spirit-Seer,” for example, took issue with the place of imagination as confused perception 
in Leibnizian metaphysics.53  In the Critique of Pure Reason, imagination links the powers of 
understanding and sensibility, but its combination with an excessively speculative faculty of 
reason must be sharply restrained by critical philosophy.  One finds a similar ambivalence in 
the moral writings.  While the “typic” of pure practical reason is necessary for moral judg-
ment, and the capacity to invent new objects of desire was necessary for the emergence of hu-
mankind aware of its power to exceed nature (according to the Conjectural Beginning of Human 
History), Kant considers sexual satisfaction through an object of imagination particularly horri-
fying, although this is certainly one way of freeing oneself from nature.54  But an indeterminate 
form provoking the imagination to play or arousing awareness of reason’s (as yet un-
deployed) power may be erotically troubling without ever leading to anything Kant would 
regard as “satisfaction.” 
Kant’s obvious preference for lawful and universal phenomena over those which are 
sporadic or indefinite has almost made it impossible to conceive of sexuality apart from the 
specific anthropological practices that lend themselves to description in terms of biological 
laws.  This is true even though in practice, humans are aesthetically moved or “troubled” by a 
great many different aspects of their fellow human beings, even when they turn this response 
into the “interested” pursuit of an act or object of determinate judgment (such as orgasm).  If 
we accept Foucault’s argument that the nineteenth century witnessed a shift in the organiza-
tion of social power from juridical structures of kinship to the incitement to sexuality, medical 
                                                 
52 One might say that pornography, which appears to be the furthest thing from Kant’s object of aesthetic 
judgment, is a way of training aesthetic taste in the specifically sexual domain. Anatomical perception is given a 
collective, communicable form through the rituals, texts, and objects of anatomy education in American 
medical schools; see Thomas Fountain, “Anatomy Education and the Observational-Embodied Look,” Medi-
cine Studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (2010), 49-69.  Does pornography substitute for ars erotica in cultures whose experi-
ence of embodiment is dominated by medicine?   
53 Immanuel Kant, “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Edition 
of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, translated and edited by David Walford and 
Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
54 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:425; Soble, 58-59, 63. 
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science is one discourse and practice suturing together those regimes so that the change was 
undetectable to most people.55  
As mentioned, Kant’s Copernican Revolution made the situated and limited human 
perceiver the only possible source of knowledge regarding experience, overturning centuries 
of efforts to define knowledge using a divine standard.  Kant’s prioritization of finitude, so 
fruitful in the scientific domain, had another unfortunate consequence for sexuality.  Kant 
himself associated finitude with the conditions of perception rather than with death (although 
both are obviously aspects of human embodiment).  On the other hand, as Foucault has 
shown, nineteenth century medicine reached its positivist threshold by identifying finitude 
with death and “disease” as the struggle of organic functions against their own capacity for 
disruption and dysfunction.56  Internal to both the perception of disease and the history of the 
living body, death threatened to appear in whatever desires or behavior resisted the vital func-
tions as identified by biological science.57   
In this context, “perverse” behavior, non-reproductive behavior of couples, the sexual 
responses of children too young to reproduce, and women’s inarticulate resistance to a sexual 
culture that denied them agency and desire were sources of nineteenth century social alarm 
that persists until this day.58  To circumvent the limitation of eroticism to its “biological” form, 
it may someday be necessary to question Kant’s blanket identification of human experience 
with finitude.  Indeed, in the essay “Preface to Transgression,” Foucault grapples with the 
problem of an infinite that would not, as in Kant and Hegel, be understood in relation to a 
limit, stating that “never did sexuality enjoy a more immediately natural understanding, and 
never did it know a greater “felicity of expression,” than in the Christian world of fallen bod-
ies and of sin.”59  Is it possible to understand eroticism and knowledge in relation to the infi-
                                                 
55 Using Foucault’s lecture course on the Abnormal, Mader shows how the nascent science of genetics enabled 
popular understandings of the body as substrate of inheritance to be transformed without social disruption, 
even to the present day; Mary Beth Mader, “Foucault’s ‘Metabody’,” Bioethical Inquiry, vol. 7, no. 2 (2010), 
187-203. 
56 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, 153-156.  
57  For example, on Vicq d’Azyr’s 1786 contribution to debates between vitalism and mechanism which Kant 
hoped Critique of the Power of Judgment might resolve: “The organic becomes the living and the living is that 
which grows, produces, and reproduces; the inorganic is the non-living, that which neither develops nor 
reproduces; it lies at the frontiers of life, the inert, the unfruitful--death;” Foucault, The Order of Things, 232.  
Later in the same text, Foucault comments with respect to the analytic of finitude instituted by Kant: “The 
death that anonymously gnaws at the daily existence of the living being is the same as that fundamental 
death on the basis of which my empirical life is given to me;” Foucault, The Order of Things, 315.  The major-
ity of medical theorists after Kant were strongly influenced by Schelling, who did not hesitate to postulate 
determinate ends and to seek a greater degree of regularity in medical phenomena than Kant himself; Wi-
esing, 226. 
58 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 104-105. 
59 Michel Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984 Vol. 2, edited by James Faubion (New York: New Press, 1998), 69.  For comparison, 
Deleuze does not return to medieval theology but to Spinoza for his idea of an immanent infinite, both em-
bodied and virtual, from which desiring-machines and affects (including pleasure and pain) are selected 
without reference to the teleology of organs and organic systems, though they may well be compatible with 
organic health. 
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nite rather than to finitude, especially a finitude figured as death, madness, or criminality—
without imagining that infinite as either a repeated and despairing transgression of bounda-
ries or as the divine source of such boundaries?  
 
We “Other Kantians”? 
All of these objections may suggest that it is absurd to even consider Kant’s Critique of the 
Power of Judgment as a resource for contesting the deployment of sexuality in the name of 
“bodies and pleasures.”  However, there are three reasons I believe this is worthwhile.  First, I 
think this was the subtext of much of Foucault’s own intellectual trajectory.  There is a strong 
thematic connection between Foucault’s early research into the archaeology of institutions and 
discourses distinguishing normal from abnormal, establishing the epistemological ground-
work for the medical and human sciences, and his later efforts to find a genealogy rather than 
a biology behind Western discourses on sex.  This thematic connection is reinforced by Fou-
cault’s persistent interest in the criteria—historical and philosophical—distinguishing “scien-
tific” from “subjugated” knowledge about numerous subjects including sexuality.  His work 
clearly suggests that the West might have developed different forms of savoir and a different 
experience of embodiment if it had begun from different aesthetic experiences, such as those 
found in Greece and early Rome. 
 Second, it is problematic to suggest we should think about sexual difference using 
Kant’s antinomies (like the Lacanians) or think about queer life using the Kantian ethics of 
autonomy and universal norms (as do many ethicists) without first recognizing how Kant con-
tributed to the development of a historical anthropology in which sexuality was a scientific 
phenomenon subject to a norm.  It is useful to consider how Kant himself might have escaped 
the system he helped build, even if he did not wish to make the effort.  In fact, Kant’s analysis 
of the transcendental conditions for knowledge of the natural world includes the capacity for 
reflective as well as “determining” judgments—that is, judgments regarding the “fit” between 
nameless forms or formlessness in nature and the communicable or contagious quality of the 
feeling they provoke in the perceiver, as well as judgments drawing conclusions from existing 
concepts.  Although Kant left sexual diversity as a problem for morality, his explorations of 
natural science and anthropology reinforced that morality in ways that cannot be easily be 
reversed without approaching the Kantian system from a new angle. 
Finally, it is important for people who practice and study queer life to be able to find a 
place within the philosophical tradition, even if that place is relatively undeveloped.  In the 
essay “Abjection and Ambiguity” Tina Chanter argues that abjection is embraced—miserably 
and rebelliously—by individuals who are unable to situate themselves elsewhere in a social 
landscape.60  One can hear echoes of something like the psychoanalytic theory of abjection put 
forward by Kristeva in Foucault’s historical accounts of exclusion and confinement, as well as 
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his explanations for the discipline-specific criteria for recognition as a speaker of truth in the 
Archaeology of Knowledge and later seminars on subjectivation.61  
Even if Kant would have been hostile to History of Sexuality, it is important to identify 
where the indeterminate attractions, acts, and affinities elaborated by other cultures and sub-
cultures Foucault calls ars erotica would have found a place in the Kantian landscape of disci-
plines and their transcendental conditions—a landscape our culture continues to cultivate.  
Perhaps there is a “territory” for these pleasures in some other history of Western philosophy, 
even one governed as much by the transcendental domains mapped out by Kant as our actual 
history turned out to be.62  In the absence of such a place, for sexual minorities to speak about 
biologically disinterested pleasure paradoxically means speaking outside of philosophy as 
well as science, our culture’s two master discourses on reason, and risks the temptation to 
identify with what is abject.   
Following the nineteenth century equation of life with teleological organic function, de-
fined against the background of death, Freud associated sexual variations with the child’s 
most basic drives of activity, passivity, and mastery—but also, in his later writings, with a 
“death drive” that ran counter to socially organized (heterosexual) Eros.63  From Bataille to 
Bersani, these pleasures have been described as “self-shattering.” Such phrasing evokes and 
challenges the foundational character of “death” that gave rise to nineteenth century medicine, 
but also risks leaving queer people in an abject corner of its episteme.   
It seems more modest to observe that shattering of self is not necessarily shattering of 
body.  In the Analytic of the Sublime, Kant specifies that pure (but communicable) reflective 
pleasure in the capacity for self-determination is only possible for a spectator who is mini-
mally protected—as a physical being—from the danger or the cognitive incomprehensibility 
against which he or she tests him or herself.64   While the sublime does not pose physical dan-
ger, however, it does disrupt the psyche, which understands its own embodiment in purely 
medical terms, and perhaps also the psyche oriented towards pragmatic or teleological inter-
ests.65  I would argue that disinterested pleasure in the beautiful involve a less obvious disrup-
                                                 
61  For example, Foucault, “The Discourse on Language,” 232-33; and Foucault, Fearless Speech, edited by Jo-
seph Pearson (New York: Semiotext(e), 2001), 72-73.  See also Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, translated by 
Léon Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 
62 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:176-177. 
63 Sigmund Freud, “The Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, edited and translated by James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74), 
111-140; Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 18, edited and translated by James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74). 
64 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 260-261.  By contrast, Burke’s account is physiological and anthropo-
logical without being medical, and includes reference to repetition, fear, pain, and desire in creating repre-
sentations; Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed-
ited Adam Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).  Unlike Kant, Burke distinguishes between de-
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65 Huffer, 76, 128-129.  
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tion of the psyche – something more akin to suspense than shattering.66  In neither case, how-
ever, is aesthetic pleasure the fate of a spectator without protection or powers who must iden-
tify as abject because he or she is radically endangered by formlessness or phenomena for which 
he or she lacks concepts.  Nor is it the fate of a spectator who embraces death because he or 
she lacks and is forbidden to invent non-biological terms for understanding his or her desire—
as Kant apparently believed when he claimed that homosexuality was worse than suicide. 
This is my final reason for explaining the relationship between the interested and disin-
terested, the aesthetic and the biological in Kant and Foucault—to ensure that there is a pro-
tected place from which non-teleological desires can be other than abject, against Kant and 
many aspects of the society he helped to structure.  Those are enough reasons to ask “what if” 
we read Kant this way—if imagination is part of reality, as Kant believed, then maybe a coun-
terfactual can be a kind of home.67 
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